Inefficient runs on viable intermediaries such as banks, money market funds (MMFs) and stablecoins can be tempered by automatic stabilizers in the form of redemption fees triggered by high withdrawals. We derive run incentives in a global games framework to characterize the optimal fee structure and its allocation to balance liquidity provision and endogenous run risk. A first result is that flat fees reduce run incentives. A central insight is that how fee revenues are allocated fundamentally changes strategic uncertainty. When fee revenues are assigned to the queue, strategic uncertainty drops while liquidity provision improves, so a high fee is optimal. A "fee-to-the-unpaid" allocation limits liquidity provision but reduces run incentives further, allowing lower fees. The optimal mix depends on asset liquidity. While low asset liquidity in banks calls for a mixed allocation, for MMFs or stablecoins the optimal mechanism converges to full "fee-to-the-queue".